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ABSTRACT

FAMILY CAP PROGRAMS: THE FUTURE OF PENNSYLVANIA
WELFARE REFORM

By
Robin Barngrover
August 2010

Thesis supervised by Dr. Ann Marie Popp, Ph.D.
Welfare reform has been a highly debated topic since before the 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and continues to
be at the forefront of many policy makers’ agendas. Although significant positive
changes have occurred in welfare policy since PRWORA’s adoption, welfare costs
remain unwieldy. This study aims to review the controversial family cap program,
already implemented in various states, to determine if it would be a beneficial step to
reducing Pennsylvania welfare costs. The following consists of a discussion of previous
national and state-level family cap research in order to determine a framework for the
economic, social, and ethical arguments associated with implementation. National data is
then used to develop regression models testing the relationship between family caps,
welfare spending, and fertility. Despite family cap proponents’ claims that caps reduce
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welfare costs and birth rates for welfare recipients, my research shows that the anticipated
benefits of family caps are generally inconclusive and largely affected by factors outside
the control of the welfare program.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………. iv
List of Tables ……………………………………………………………………......….viii
Introduction ……………………………………………………………….……………... 1
Literature Review ………………………………………………………………………... 3
Welfare History ………………………………………………………………….. 3
Family Cap Policy ……………………………………………………………….. 9
National Family Cap Evaluation …...................................................................... 10
New Jersey Family Cap Evaluation ..............................................................…... 14
Family Cap Challenges ……………………..………………………………….. 15
Misconceptions ………………………………..……………………………….. 19
Methods …………………………………………...……………………………………. 25
Data …………………………………….………………………………………. 25
Source of Data …………………………….……………………………………. 26
Research Population ……………………….…………………………………… 26
Variables ……………………………...…….………………………………….. 27
Research Hypotheses …………………………………………………………... 29
Results …………………………………………………………………………….……. 32
Univariate Analysis …………………………………………………………….. 32
Welfare per Recipient T-Test ………………………………………………...… 34
Children in Welfare Family T-Test …………………………………………….. 35
Population on Welfare T-Test ………………………………………………….. 36

vi

Correlation Analysis …………………………………………………………… 37
Welfare per Recipient Linear Regression ……………………………………… 38
Children in Welfare Family Linear Regression ………………………………... 39
Welfare Population Linear Regression ………………………………………… 39
Discussion ……………………………………………………………………………… 40
Findings ………………………………………………………………………... 40
Limitations ……………………………………………………………………... 42
Future Research ………………………………………………………………... 43
Policy Recommendations ……………………………………………………… 44
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………... 45
References ……………………………………………………………………………… 47
Appendix ……………………………………………………………………………….. 52

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables ……………………………....……. 52
Table 2: T-Test Analysis Results ……………………………………………….…….... 53
Table 3.1: Correlation Analysis ………………………………………………….….…. 54
Table 3.2: Correlation Analysis Continued ……………………………………............. 55
Table 4: Regression Analysis of Logged Welfare per Recipient …………….…..…….. 56
Table 5: Regression Analysis of Children in Welfare Family ………………………..... 57
Table 6: Regression Analysis of Welfare Population ………………………..………… 58

viii

Introduction
The United States‟ welfare system has undergone dramatic changes since the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996. Statistics show
that welfare rolls and subsequent welfare budget expenses have decreased significantly.
In Pennsylvania alone, the number of cash recipients decreased from 553,235 in January
1996 to 263,005 in January 2006 (US Dept. of Health and Human Services 2007).
However, these statistics do not tell the whole story. Researchers continue to debate
whether PRWORA was primarily responsible for the sharp decline in welfare recipients,
or if extraneous factors such as the strong economy and low unemployment rates of the
1990s had a greater impact on welfare statistics (Besharov 2007). Because researchers
cannot isolate PRWORA as the primary catalyst for these dramatic welfare changes,
additional welfare reform research and policy/program updates are still relevant.
In 2006, Pennsylvania spent $902 million on Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) cash benefits and in-kind services alone (US Dept. of Health and
Human Services 2009). Despite the dramatic caseload reductions since the 1990s,
welfare spending is still enormous. This expense, combined with the current weakening
economy, rise of unemployment and uncertainty regarding the future of Social Security
and Medicaid spending, makes further research on welfare reform a compelling issue. If
there were a feasible way to reduce the amount of state and federal dollars spent on
welfare benefits without unduly affecting the lives of welfare recipients, then this could
lessen the taxpayer burden of funding social services and perhaps allow money to be
filtered into other programs.
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Family caps have been adopted by almost half of the United States as a means of
reducing welfare expenses. Although the restriction of reproductive rights introduces a
host of legal and ethical questions, welfare policy changes such as family caps limiting
the number of children supported under the welfare system could not only reduce the
number of welfare recipients, but also help to stop the cycle of dependence amongst
many welfare clients. I want to explore the viability of state-mandated limits to the
number of children supported financially under the welfare system. Does research show
that family caps lead to statistically significant decreases in welfare spending? Is a
financial disincentive really enough to affect reproductive trends? Are these programs
ethical? Are there more viable alternatives to the family cap? While the restriction of
reproductive rights is a controversial topic, I believe that the potential social and
economic benefits make it worth exploring.
Statistics on welfare recipients are abundant, particularly since PRWORA in
1996. When looking at variables such as family caps and their effect on the number of
welfare recipients in participating states, the Department of Public Welfare and Office of
Family Assistance publish yearly reports by state and within states by race, family
composition, education, and various other demographic variables. Using these statistics
will help to determine whether family caps actually lead to reduced numbers of welfare
recipients and expenses. I can then examine whether this policy should be implemented
in Pennsylvania. Data including average cash spending per recipient, maximum cash
benefits, family size, number of children in welfare households, poverty rates, birth rate,
educational statistics, unemployment rate, and personal income will be collected from all
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50 states. A regression model will then be completed in order to determine if family caps
actually have a significant effect on welfare spending and fertility.
By examining this data and completing various statistical models and analyses, I
should be able to determine the effectiveness of family caps in reducing welfare spending
and recipient fertility. This study is unique because it combines independent quantitative
research and data analysis with a discussion of the more personal and less easily
measurable determinants of reproductive choices. After evaluating the past studies and
current analyses, I will be able to make a policy recommendation to the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania.

Literature Review
Welfare History
Additional welfare reform is not possible without first reviewing current welfare
policy. As stated earlier, the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996 instituted major
changes in the welfare system, particularly dismantling the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and establishing Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF). As included in the Social Security Act of 1935, AFDC‟s original title
at its 1935 introduction was Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) and focused primarily on
the children of widows and the disabled. Before the Social Security Act, social programs
were mainly implemented and funded by private charities and churches, and services
were generally limited to community residents. However, the overwhelming need
created by the Great Depression quickly exhausted the funds of local charities and left
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many people without a means of subsistence (Rose 1989). The government‟s response to
this need was through development of federal assistance programs.
At its introductory stages, ADC payments were limited to the needy child only
and the program made no mention of financially supporting the parent or guardian of the
child, although a parent or relative must be made the payment name (US Dept. of Health
and Human Service 2007). ADC‟s original goal was to support needy children in their
homes, as the imagined recipients were widows and these widows were not expected to
work outside of the home. Because a widow‟s financial difficulties were considered
beyond her control, the early recipients of ADC were considered the “deserving poor”
(Rose 1989:66). Government assistance was meant to enable women to maintain their
familial roles of keeping house and raising children without the need for employment
outside of the home.
Aside from ADC, the only other federal social insurance programs available at the
time were Old-Age Insurance (OAI) and Unemployment Compensation (UC), both
included with ADC in the Social Security Act of 1935. However, these programs
initially excluded domestic and agricultural workers. This left a large segment of the
population, particularly black men, without any means of public assistance if they were
unable to work (Davies 1997:221). Although The Social Security Act was meant to
provide a financial safety net for all Americans, the actual scope was quite limited.
While federal programs were being initiated in the 1930s, it would take almost 30 years
before the next major shift in social welfare policy. Changes in social norms and shifting
views of poverty would lead to major expansion of social welfare programs.
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In the 1950s, AFDC expanded to allow monetary payments to the mother or
guardian of the needy child, but the largest change in AFDC benefits would not come
until a decade later (US Census Bureau 1996). In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson
championed the War on Poverty. Americans were increasingly exposed to the reality of
poverty and economic inequality through media coverage of the growing Civil Rights
movement and depictions of the clear disparity of wealth present in the United States.
Johnson took advantage of this political climate to implement federal assistance programs
such as Medicaid, Medicare, food stamps, and work initiatives (Peterson 1985). He also
expanded AFDC to include cash payment for both the mother and father of needy
children.
The liberalization of AFDC in the 1960‟s and 1970‟s is often cited as a main
contributor to the unwieldy growth of the welfare system. Caseloads rose by 230 percent
between 1963 and 1973 alone, and this increase was not attributed to a poor economy or
high rates of unemployment like most rises in welfare rolls. Instead, research shows that
the expansion of programs, improved ease of application and eligibility determination,
and lessened social stigma were the main factors in welfare‟s rise in the 1960‟s and
1970‟s (Besharov 2007).
The next major shift in welfare policy came in the 1980s. President Ronald
Reagan‟s viewed the welfare system as a hindrance to self-sufficiency. Based on the
ideology that government assistance was at-odds with a capitalist society, he aimed to
reconfigure the cash payment system of assistance (Karger and Stoesz 1993). One of the
most detrimental changes to AFDC came from the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) of 1981. OBRA limited work-expense deductions, child care allowances, and
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income disregards for employed welfare recipients, leading to a many ineligible families
(Karger and Stoesz 1993). However, many families found that the expenses associated
with working outside of the household did not amount to more income than AFDC
benefits. For many recipients, OBRA arguably made welfare more financially prudent
than employment.
Another major aspect of Reagan‟s welfare reform was the use of tax reductions in
place of cash benefits. In theory, if low-income families were exempt from taxes and/or
received tax rebates, this money could be used in lieu of cash benefits. However, the
returns received from tax incentives were not equal to the amount of cash lost from
AFDC ineligibility, leaving many low-income families in worse poverty than they had
ever known (Karger and Stoesz 1993). The tax reconfiguration also led to the largest
income disparity between rich and poor in recorded U.S. history and an unprecedented $3
trillion budget deficit (Karger and Stoesz 1993).
One of the final major changes in welfare policy during the Reagan administration
was the Family Support Act of 1988. As a provision of the Act, two-parent households
were mandated to have one parent enroll in an unpaid job for 16 hours per week in
exchange for benefits. Rather than encouraging employment, the policy made two-parent
families unprofitable. If parents lived separately, the mother could receive benefits while
remaining exempt from the work program while the father worked without any reduction
in AFDC. The father could also potentially receive food stamps or other state and federal
benefits without affecting the mother‟s AFDC. This policy change is often cited as one
of the major disincentives for cohabitation amongst welfare parents.
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By 1994, welfare rolls ballooned to around five million, up from 147,000 families
in 1936 (Besharov 2007). Despite the increasing numbers, AFDC was widely criticized
for failing to provide adequate income to meet basic needs without providing substantial
work programs or incentives. In 1992, only 6.6 percent of AFDC recipients were
employed, and most of these jobs were part-time (Rodgers 2005). Without feasible
work-support programs, the decrease in cash benefits combined with work and childcare
expenses made employment less profitable than welfare for most recipients. Most
recipients of AFDC benefited financially by remaining unemployed and unmarried, and
this is obviously not the intent of a successful welfare program.
By the 1990‟s, welfare policies and welfare program spending debates had
reached a boiling point. One of the largest points of contention, aside from overall
welfare spending, was the growing trend of single motherhood. Out-of-wedlock births
accounted for 32.6 percent of the population in 1994, up from 3.8 percent in 1940 (US
General Accounting Office 2001). While the ethics of out-of-wedlock childbirth are
debatable, one issue is not: single mothers statistically cost the government more money
than married women, particularly if they are younger than 18 when they give birth to
their first child. Unmarried teenagers who give birth are more likely to receive welfare
benefits and remain on assistance for more years than their older and/or married
counterparts. A study completed by the Congressional Budget Office in 1990 also
showed that three-quarters of unmarried mothers under the age of 18 received cash
assistance from AFDC within five years of giving birth to their first child (US General
Accounting Office 2001). Additionally, studies completed on AFDC recipients showed
that children born out-of-wedlock were three times more likely to receive cash assistance
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once they reached adulthood (US Department of Health and Human Services 1996).
With the enormous growth of out-of-wedlock births and the inflating cost of welfare
expenses, policy makers were poised for a change.
When President Clinton took office in 1992, he vowed to “end welfare as we
know it” (Besharov 2007). His 1996 Personal Responsibility Act focused on three main
goals for welfare reform: 1) reduce welfare dependence and increase employment; 2)
reduce child poverty; and 3) reduce children born out-of-wedlock and reinforce marriage
(Kim 2006). In order to accomplish these goals, PRWORA began by replacing AFDC
with the TANF program. Under AFDC, most families were eligible for cash benefits as
long as they met the financial and resources criteria. There were no time limits on
benefits. PRWORA ended the “legal entitlement” to welfare, and stressed the importance
of economic independence for welfare recipients (US General Accounting Office
2001:4). Rather than maintaining or supplementing the livelihood of the recipient, the
new welfare system was designed as a means of breaking the cycle of dependency on
government assistance by assisting welfare clients with employment and training
activities. The schooling and/or job skills acquired while receiving TANF benefits was
meant to foster self-sufficiency for both the recipient and, optimistically, their future
generations.
Under TANF, recipients are subject to lifetime limits of five years, mandatory
employment and training programs, and disqualification/sanction for failure to seek child
support in single-parent families. Additionally, there is no disincentive for two-parent
households as both parents can be eligible for inclusion in the grant. Although there has
been debate over the extent of PRWORA‟s role in achieving the aforementioned goals,
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the results, whether attributed mainly to welfare reform, the strong economy, or both,
have been substantial. Nationally, welfare caseloads have fallen by 56 percent since
1996, employment of single mothers increased by almost 50 percent, and the child
poverty rate fell from 20.8 percent in 1995 to 17.8 percent in 2004 (Kim 2006). Welfare
births out-of-wedlock have not decreased since PRWORA, but they have only risen by
2.4 percent from 1995 to 2003 (Kim 2006). Many theorists agree that while economics
certainly played a large role in the decrease of welfare recipients, PRWORA also had a
significant effect on the decline.

Family Cap Policy
While PRWORA established minimum federal TANF guidelines concerning time
limits and employment/training programs in order to meet its first two goals of reduced
welfare dependence/increased employment and reduced child poverty, the optional
family cap program was the only directive specifically aimed at discouraging out-of
wedlock births or encouraging marriage as stated in the third goal (Joyce 2004:475). The
general idea behind a family cap plan is that any child conceived while the parent is
receiving cash assistance will be excluded from the cash grant. To date, 24 states have
adopted some sort of family cap program, ranging from total denial of cash benefits for
children conceived while in the system to reduced additional benefits to a flat grant
regardless of family size. However, Maryland and Illinois later rescinded their family
cap, so only 22 states currently have intact family cap programs. Pennsylvania opted out
of the family cap program entirely. However, a study of existing family cap programs
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and their societal and economic effects could lead to the reformation of Pennsylvania
welfare policy.
The philosophical idea behind family caps is that women should delay
childbearing until they are financially stable and not dependent on state or federal monies
to support their children. Many proponents of the family cap program believe that
welfare recipients‟ norms are out of sync with the rest of America. The family cap policy
is meant to change welfare recipients‟ definition of children from financial incentives to
financial responsibilities (Jagannathan 2003). Following an economic model of fertility,
one would assume that when the net cost of children increases, the demand for children
will decrease (Dyer 2004:442). This decrease in children born onto welfare rolls should
theoretically reduce welfare costs for states implementing caps. However, after extensive
research and experiments, the results of the family cap plan are varied.

National Family Cap Evaluation
While the initial bulk of family cap research focused almost solely on state-level
studies, more recent research has expanded beyond state-level analysis to include
observational and experimental national-level studies and comparisons. One of the first
and largest national family cap studies was published in 2001 by the United States
General Accounting Office (GAO). Using data from July 2000 through September 2001,
the purpose of the study was to establish how many families had been subject to a family
cap, analyze their subsequent cash loss, and use previously published reports to establish
family caps‟ effects on poverty, non-married births, and abortion rates (US General
Accounting Office 2001:1). The GAO determined that despite declines in caseload
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numbers and general welfare spending among family cap states, they could not establish
a statistically significant relationship between family caps and poverty, non-married
births or caseload reduction.
Despite the lack of significant relationships, the GAO did not suggest that family
caps were ineffective in reducing poverty out-of-wedlock, childbirth, or caseload size.
Instead, they focused on the difficulties associated with measuring family cap effects and
the limitations of their research. The GAO states that one of their study‟s largest
obstacles was the overwhelming number of welfare policies+ implemented in the last
decade. With PRWORA‟s push for self-sufficiency and competing state-level initiatives,
distinguishing family caps‟ specific effects was a major difficulty. Coincidental changes
in societal norms, such as decreased birth rates in the 1990s, also lead to a muddied
relationship between family caps and fertility/welfare spending (US General Accounting
Office 2001:20).
Other major limitations named by the GAO were lack of information and
inconsistent state reporting. States tended to focus their research and efforts on the
employment and training initiatives associated with PRWORA rather than the goal of
reducing out-of-wedlock births. The GAO authors speculated that states are more
comfortable and confident in their abilities to improve employment rates since “more
consensus exists about the role of government in helping welfare recipients become
employed than about its role in influencing people‟s childbearing decisions” (US General
Accounting Office 2001:24). This statement hints not only at the vast difference between
states‟ responses to out-of-wedlock births, but also the intrinsic difficulty associated with
fertility policy. Along with general lack of information, states also varied in their reports
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to the GAO. Some states used the federal fiscal year data while others used the state‟s
fiscal year data. Even more importantly, some states provided information on their entire
TANF population, while others sent data from samples or only estimates. This
inconsistent reporting could have led to inaccurate data analyses.
Overall, the GAO‟s primary policy recommendation to the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services was to “take steps to identify, encourage, and support
additional studies that would increase the availability of information on how to prevent
and reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies and more fully support the goals of TANF” (US
General Accounting Office, 2001:38). They neither confirmed nor denied the possibility
of a relationship between family caps and reduced non-married births and caseload
reduction. Rather, they suggested that future long-term studies may help to decrease the
unwanted effects of other PRWORA-era welfare reform and fertility trends.
In order to test the GAO‟s suspicion that future studies may result in more
concrete evidence of family caps‟ effectiveness, I researched a variety of subsequent
family cap studies between 2001-present. One of the most substantial studies, “How
Family Caps Work: Evidence from a National Study” was published in 2009 by Michael
J. Camasso and Radha Jagannathan. Jagannathan had done previous research on New
Jersey‟s family cap, but this study uses data from 1980 through 2000, incorporates all 50
states and uses several fertility variables, including general pregnancy rate, out-ofwedlock births, abortion rate, and illegitimacy percentages (Camasso and Jagannathan
2009). Many other family cap studies focus primarily on nonmarital births since this was
specifically target of PRWORA, but they have expanded the definition of fertility.
Control variables such as states‟ Medicaid policy enforcement, individual work reforms,
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political climate, race, ethnicity, and various economic demographics were introduced in
order to account for the numerous factors also affecting fertility behavior (Camasso and
Jagannathan 2009). This study did not focus on welfare caseload reduction or decreased
spending since this is an inferred consequence of decreased fertility.
Despite this study‟s use of increased time lines, national data, and numerous
control variables, the exact effectiveness of family cap policies were generally
inconclusive. The study shows that family caps have little effect on pregnancy rates, but
that there is a relationship between family caps and non-marital birth rates. However,
this relationship is not clear-cut. Camasso and Jagannathan report that:
Non-marital birth rates and illegitimacy ratios are lower and abortion rates are higher in states
where the family cap is conditioned by larger-than-average populations of black women and
Medicaid funding for abortion than those in states where these policies and population
characteristics are absent. (2009, p. 419)

This finding leads the authors to question whether the availability of free and/or low cost
abortion is skewing the results of the family cap analysis. Is there actually a relationship
between family caps and fertility if women are getting pregnant at the same rate but show
a decrease in actual birth rate? Additionally, with the presence of a large black
population having a statistically significant effect on the fertility rates of capped women,
one must question the influence of cultural norms and practices. Although this study
does not find a significant and exclusive relationship between family caps and decreased
fertility rates, it raises questions about the effectiveness of the family cap as a stand-alone
program. The link between race and Medicaid programs with fertility decisions could
help legitimize the call for less generalized welfare reform policies.
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New Jersey Family Cap Evaluation
One of the first states to implement a family cap policy, and perhaps the most
widely researched, is New Jersey. The vast amount of quantitative and qualitative
research on New Jersey‟s family cap makes it a valuable resource for any state
considering family cap implementation. New Jersey‟s family cap program was signed
into law under the Family Development plan of 1992, well before the adoption of
PRWORA. This policy would later be supported under TANF, but would not be
mandatory (Devere 1998). Under New Jersey‟s program, after a 10 month “grace
period,” any child born to a recipient of AFDC would be excluded from the cash grant.
While the child could still be eligible for Medicaid and food stamp benefits, parents
would no longer receive the additional $102/month for the first child or $64/month for
any additional child. Policy makers believed that this disincentive would lead to
decreased birth and thus lowered welfare caseloads and reduced spending.
On the surface, the New Jersey family cap policy appears to have been successful
in its primary goal of limiting births, and thus limiting the output of cash assistance to
welfare recipients. From October 1992 to December 1996, 14,000 births were averted,
ongoing welfare clients showed a 9 percent decrease in birth rate, and new welfare clients
showed a 12 percent decrease in birth rates (Levin-Epstein 1999:1-2). Many states used
the statistics of these initial program studies to initiate their own family cap policies.
However, there are many issues that must be taken into account when judging the failure
or success of New Jersey‟s family cap plan.
While statistics show a decrease in birthrate for New Jersey and most family cap
states, statistics do not necessarily show a direct relationship between family cap and
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decreased birthrates. Researchers conceded that other issues, such as media coverage of
the impending PRWORA policy adoption and miscommunication and incorrect
information regarding the family cap policies may have led to inaccurate results. Clients
may have been concerned with the proposed time restrictions or other upcoming, highly
publicized PRWORA changes and rumors, and rethought their family planning
accordingly. The results of family cap evaluations in both New Jersey and Arkansas
showed that while there was a significant decrease in birthrate among capped families,
the non-capped control groups experienced almost identical deceases in birthrate (Dyer
2004:443).
Another problem with many of the early family cap studies was contamination
bias. Misinformation among welfare clients may have led to vast underreporting of
newborns. A survey conducted in the first year of the New Jersey family cap program
showed that 35% of clients subject to the family cap believed that their children would
also be excluded from the Medicaid and food stamp budgets as well (Levin-Epstein
1999:4). Women who believe that their newborns will not be eligible for any benefits
may not report the birth to their caseworkers at all, thus skewing the data.
Family Cap Challenges
Along with the possibility of outside influence and internal confusion affecting
the reliability of the statistics, the success of the any family cap policy must also be
reviewed in light of varying ethical issues. For example, along with decreased birthrate,
abortion rates among welfare clients skyrocketed. One of the first studies estimates 1,400
additional abortions between 1992 and 1996, which were directly related to the family
cap policy (Levin-Epstein 1999:1). This is a huge criticism of New Jersey‟s family cap
15

program and a major concern for other capped states. Although New Jersey advocated
increased family planning services and reproductive education available to clients,
studies also showed that implementation of these optional family planning services
differed greatly from county to county, and in many cases was a “suggested” topic during
interviews, not part of the mandatory services or specifically included anywhere in
manuals (Devere 1998). Clients were told to stop having children, but in many
circumstances were not provided with adequate family planning education or resources.
In lieu of birth control or abstinence, abortion was the most commonly used form of
“family planning.” While abortion is legal in the United States, it is still a major issue of
debate among American citizens. Although it was not the intended effect, policy makers
need to ask themselves whether or not a decrease in birthrates among welfare clients is
worth the increase in abortion and/or the negative publicity these results are bound to
have.
In addition to the abortion controversy, the very legality of family cap programs
has been questioned. Is it lawful for the state or federal government to restrict the
reproductive behavior of welfare recipients? Is this a freedom protected by the
Constitution? There have been many attempts to eliminate family caps in several states,
particularly in New Jersey. In the case of C.K. v. New Jersey Department of Human
Services, the plaintiffs argues that family cap programs were “infringing on the
fundamental right to make private procreative choices through broad and intrusive
means” (Smith 2000:181). Several other lawsuits made similar claims of family caps
taking away the personal freedoms protected by the Constitution. However, the New
Jersey judicial system has upheld and even lauded the family cap program in every
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lawsuit to date. The district court in the C.K. v. New Jersey Department of Human
Services case even went so far as to say, “The Family Cap, by maintaining the level of
AFDC benefits despite the arrival of an additional child, puts the welfare household in
the same situation of that of a working family” (Smith 2000:182). Aside from ruling that
the family cap program was constitutional and not unduly coercive, the court expressed
the opinion that family caps were “giving welfare recipients the same incentive as
„working people,‟ enhancing the role of individual responsibility, and strengthening and
stabilizing families” (Smith, 2000, p. 183). While ethical questions still persist, family
cap programs have thus far been supported by the court system.
Although family cap policies have so far been considered constitutional and
proven successful in reducing the birthrate of welfare recipients, many opponents argue
that family cap programs essentially stem from repressed racist and sexist notions. In
response to developing family cap programs, former Justice Thurgood Marshall
expressed fear that this policy would “wield its economic whip over disfranchised
groups, forcing them to dance in response to the dominant group‟s fantasies and phobias
about its own Soul” (Smith 2000:181). The idea of America‟s repressed fear is best
explained through sociologist Wilfred Bion‟s so-called “fight-flight” response to a
group‟s fear or anxiety. This fight-flight response mirrors a kind of scapegoat mentality
where group leaders will project their anxiety and fear onto a common enemy (Morgan
2006:224). In the case of the family cap programs, it has been argued that the increasing
population growth of minority groups, particularly blacks, has led the white majority to
seek means of limiting their reproduction in order to maintain control. Because the
majority of welfare recipients are black and Hispanic, white policy makers have been
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accused of targeting this low income group, operating on the guise that family caps are
intended to decrease welfare cost and encourage employment. However, as sociologist
Gareth Morgan states, “Time and energy tend to be devoted to fighting or protecting the
group from the perceived danger rather than taking a more balanced look at the problems
that are evident in the situation” (Morgan 2006:224).
The family cap program has also been criticized as an unnecessary form of
societal domination. In this case, it is domination of rich over poor and whites over
minorities. The traditional dominance of white men over blacks and women is ingrained
in American history. Although women and minorities now technically have the same
rights and freedoms as white men, many Americans still unconsciously subscribe to the
ideal that white men, specifically our politicians and lawmakers, have the right to impose
their judgment or will onto others (Morgan 2006:294). The power of rich over poor is
also strengthened by our capitalistic culture. The American dream is that anyone can rise
up and make a happy and financially successful life for themselves if they work hard
enough. If a person is unable to support themselves financially, they must be unwilling to
work or pull themselves out of poverty. This prevalent idea makes it easy for the rich to
dominate the poor, particularly in a capitalistic society. However, this role of domination
has been criticized as trivializing the issue of reproductive rights and reducing welfare
clients to the role of children incapable of handling their own lives. Despite traditional
roles, poverty does not necessarily warrant control over the reproductive rights of welfare
recipients.
Despite the seemingly unanswerable questions of morality surrounding the family
cap, one fact remains: Pennsylvania‟s welfare spending is enormous and out-of-wedlock
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births are still growing. While Pennsylvania‟s population is only 40 percent larger than
New Jersey‟s, Pennsylvania‟s TANF cash output is over 400 percent higher, with New
Jersey spending $78 million in 2006 and Pennsylvania topping out at $393 million (US
Department of Health and Human Services 2009). These numbers do not even include
in-kind services or administrative expenses. Additionally, New Jersey TANF recipients‟
out-of-wedlock births in 2006 totaled 787, or less than 1 percent of their TANF
population. Pennsylvania TANF recipients‟ out-of-wedlock births in 2006 totaled
29,040, or over 12.5 percent of their TANF population. However, the family cap
program may offer Pennsylvania the chance to reduce the overwhelming cost of TANF
assistance benefits and curb the trend of out-of-wedlock births among welfare clients.

Misconceptions
While policy makers continue to debate the effectiveness of family cap programs
in reducing the fertility of welfare recipients and decreasing spending, a greater question
remains: what influences the fertility trends and reproductive choices of lower-income
women? Family cap policies work on the assumption that the threat of decreased (or at
least not increased) cash assistance will be sufficient motivation for a woman to limit
family size, particularly by reducing out-of-wedlock children. This model presumes that
issues as personal and complicated as reproductive choices can be influenced by a blackand-white economic formula (Miller 1996). However, there are much greater indicators
of fertility and family make-up than income alone.
While there have been many statistics published about increased out-of-wedlock
births, particularly in lower socioeconomic populations, it is important to review the

19

social and cultural explanations of this trend rather than just the economic consequences.
Studies have shown that many girls‟ intentional teen pregnancies are attributed to “desire
for unconditional love and their need for attention and respect from the community”
(Horvath-Rose 2008:121). In some communities, particularly amongst black and urban
teens, having children is seen as a rite of passage into adulthood. While the “American
dream” standards of adulthood; college degree, prosperous employment, marriage,
homeownership, savings and financial security may be out of reach, teenagers and young
adults without the economic or educational means to meet the aforementioned goals can
still assert their adulthood and independence through childbearing. In their discussion of
gender roles amongst black and white families, sociologists Shirley A. Hill and Joey
Sprague theorize about common responses of black men in lower socio-economic
climates when they find themselves unable to achieve many of America‟s cultural norms:
Even at an early age, these barriers lead many poor young Black men to express their
„masculinity‟ by rejecting the importance of conventional norms like getting a good education
and focusing on sexuality or „cool pose‟ as alternative sources of esteem. Male denigration
then becomes common, especially in low-income Black communities, where men are often
viewed as irresponsible and unreliable. (1999, pp. 484-485)

When men and women in depressed socioeconomic settings lack the means to achieve
the normative goals in society, they make their own ends.
In a study of fertility and marriage determinants among high school seniors,
Robert D. Plotnick discusses a three-pronged framework used to explain and predict
teens‟ thoughts and goals concerning marriage, child birth, and nonmarital childbirth.
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Figure 1: Teen Determinants of Expected Marriage and Parenthood
Opportunity
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control
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marriage,
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Source: Robert D. Plotnick: Adolescent Expectations and Desires about
Marriage and Parenthood: 2007. Journal of Adolescence, p. 944
According to this theory, there are three main perspectives which influence a teen‟s
attitude towards marriage and childbearing. The first is family context, which states that
the socioeconomic status, values, cultural background, and gender socialization of a
child‟s family will shape the child‟s future familial goals and expectations (2007:945).
For instance, children from single-parent homes are more apt to anticipate nonmarital
childbirth and/or childbirth at an earlier age. Children raised in a married, two-parent
household, are more likely to expect marriage and delayed childbearing. Family
members‟ education levels and income also affect children‟s expectations. More
specifically, the lower the income and education levels, the more likely the child is to
expect out-of-wedlock and/or early childbearing. Children‟s norms are often molded by
their earliest and most immediate surroundings, so family members‟ characteristics and
actions will shape their response to societal norms. Family context is an important part of
Plotnick‟s theory because it has an effect on both of the other prongs as well.
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The second prong of Plotnick‟s theory is the opportunity cost perspective. This
perspective maintains that teens internally weigh the time and effort needed to complete
“human capital investment activities” such as graduating from high school, attending
college or trade schools, seeking employment, building personal relationships before they
decide to marry or have children (2007:945). If a young person expects that they will
earn an advanced degree, be a homeowner, have a successful career, or a variety of other
status markers, they will be less likely to expect early and/or out-of-wedlock childbirth.
Plotnick goes on to state that even without concrete goals, children with higher academic
achievement will also be less likely to agree with or expect early and/or unwed
pregnancy. As stated earlier, a person‟s opportunity cost perspective is heavily
influenced by their family context, as well as peer and community relationships.
The final prong of Plotnick‟s perspective theory centers on a person‟s senses of
self-esteem and personal control. He states that teens with high self-esteem and internal
locus are more likely to delay childbirth and less likely to have children out-of-wedlock
(2007). A person may also have a greater ability to offset negative family context when
they believe that they have control over their decisions. If a teen accepts that they are
responsible for determining their life path rather than following in the footsteps of a
family member or peer, they are less likely to become a parent at a young age (whether
married or not).
While Plotnick‟s theory revolves around the expectations rather than the actions
of teens, his research shows that expectations are generally accurate predictors of future
actions. For example, in a 2000 study of racially and ethnically diverse teens enrolled as
high school seniors, he found that 20-22 percent of black students expected or desired a
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nonmarital birth, as well as 12-15 percent of Hispanics and 6-8 percent of non-Hispanic
whites (2007:958). This trend is present in actual outcomes as well, albeit with higher
rates: among adult women in the United States, 77 percent of black women, 40 percent of
Hispanic women, and 33 percent on non-Hispanic whites are unmarried at the birth of
their first child (2007:858). Family cap policies are reactive measures, aimed at
influencing behavior after a woman has already entered welfare rolls, which do not
address issues concerning culture, education, ambition, or self-worth. If Plotnick is
correct in his family context, opportunity cost, and self-esteem perspectives, one might
assume that the income disincentives associated with family caps would not be able to
override the more personal and complex factors associated with childbearing. Family
caps also fail to consider the marked difference in childbearing trends between certain
racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups.
While the aforementioned perspectives help to explain the decision-making
factors behind why teens are having children at a younger age and out-of-wedlock, it
does little to explain why many welfare recipients and women of lower socioeconomic
standing never marry. One theory put forth by sociologists Deborah Roempke Graefe
and Daniel T. Lichter focuses on the financial incentives and disincentives associated
with marriage, particularly for low-income women. They argue that “marriage is
increasingly a „luxury good‟ that is often outside the economic reach of low-income
couples” (2008:480). Women have no incentive to marry a poor man with limited
education and either no employment or earning subsistence wages. In many
circumstances, a single mother living without her child‟s father can reduce her expenses
by receiving higher welfare and in-kind benefits without risking the cost of divorce or
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expense of another household member. Welfare becomes “an income alternative to
marriage among economically disadvantaged nonmarital birth mothers” (Graefe
2008:480).
Along with the income disadvantages often associated with marrying an
unemployed or under-employed man, a woman may also find herself at a marital
disadvantage once she has had a child out-of-wedlock. According to economic models of
marriage, men and women bring certain traits to the relationship table, much like a
candidate at a job interview. A potential spouse may take into consideration attributes
such as education, employment, attractiveness, personality, and resources. If a woman
already has a child from another marriage, particularly a child without support from the
biological father, she is often times categorized as a less-desirable marriage candidate.
One could assume that the woman would already have considerably more expenses and
time restraints than a childless woman, and may also have fewer job opportunities or
education, particularly considering growing childcare expenses in the U.S. Even
including higher-income women, studies show that unwed mothers are about 50 percent
less likely to ever marry as other women (Graefe 2008:481). Among nonmarital birth
mothers that do eventually marry, they have a significantly higher chance of marrying a
low-educated man than childless women (Graefe 2008).
The economic model of marriage for women in lower-socioeconomic groups
appears to have a delicate and precarious relationship with Plotnick‟s perspectives theory.
It seems that a variety of cultural and personal attributes shape a woman‟s decision and
attitudes towards nonmarital childbirth, and her subsequent actions help to determine her
likelihood of marriage. Although income may be a decided factor in a woman‟s decision
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to marry her baby‟s father or to marry in the future, the role of family caps in effecting
marital trends seems uncertain. One could argue that frozen cash assistance benefits may
discourage a woman from living apart from her baby‟s father. If welfare does not
increase with him outside of the household, then a woman may be more likely to
cohabitate with and perhaps eventually marry her baby‟s father. However, monetary
disincentives are certainly not the only or even the strongest motivation in a person‟s
decision to marry or to have children out of wedlock. The stereotypical image of
“welfare queens” becoming rich on taxpayers‟ dollars is simply a fallacy.

Methods of Research
Data
In evaluating the family cap policy, I will utilize secondary data sources and
collect state statistics from federal government websites. From the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, I will collect statistics and information about each state‟s
welfare program including family cap status, average amount spent per welfare recipient,
average number of children in welfare families, total cash spending, maximum cash
benefits and average welfare family size. From the U.S. Census Bureau, I collected
statistics on the general population of each state including percentage of states‟
population receiving welfare benefits, states‟ population at or below poverty level,
average state family size, birthrate, education levels, personal income per capita, and
region From the U.S. Department of Labor, I have gathered the unemployment rates for
each state.
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Source of Data
The data utilized in this research are from federal government sources. While
individual state data was initially sought, the reports were inconsistent. For example,
while many states reported their cash and in-kind expenses separately, some combined
both federal and state monies paid towards cash and in-kind programs, making it difficult
to differentiate which funds were coming from federal versus state sources. In the
interest of consistency, this research is focused only on federal TANF cash and in-kind
payouts, not state-funded disability cash assistance or supplemental assistance programs.
Any additional programs or monies provided by individual states would compromise the
data set, so state data was unusable if the cash sources were indecipherable. These varied
methods of organization and diverse terminology used to illustrate cash data led to
confusion among variables, particularly in the discussion of welfare cash benefits.
Because of limited time available for deciphering language and policy discrepancies,
federal resources were utilized in order to maintain clarity and consistency. Therefore,
using the federal government as the source of the data ensured that all necessary data was
available, the statistics were calculated using the same formula and the timeframe was
consistent across states and type of statistics. Due to a lag in reporting government
statistics, the statistics utilized in this research project are from 2006.

Research Population
The population for this research project consists of all 50 states. There is no
sample for the research as this is a population study. The availability of federal data and
the ability to use the entire population eliminates the risks involved with sampling such as
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gathering a biased sample or making incorrect assumptions about a population based on a
sample of answers. There is a greater likelihood of error when a sample is used. U.S.
territories were not included in this research because they are generally not included in
federal welfare statistical reports. While some of the demographic information was
available, reliable welfare statistics were not readily available.

Variables
The data will be used to determine whether family caps contribute to a decrease in
welfare spending, fertility rates, and/or size of welfare population in each state. For this
research project, the dependent variables are welfare spending, welfare fertility rates, and
welfare population. Welfare spending is represented by the variable welfare spending per
recipient. This variable was calculated by dividing each state‟s total cash welfare
spending by its total number of welfare recipients. Total cash welfare spending includes
each state‟s annual spending on cash payouts as well as in-kind services in order to form
the variable total welfare budget. In-kind services vary from state to state, but include
payments for child care services, education and training programs, transportation,
clothing allowances, and other job-related expenses for cash recipients. Medicaid and
food stamp expenses are not included in the variable total welfare budget. Total welfare
budget and number of welfare recipients was found in the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services‟ (HHS) Eighth Annual Report to Congress (US Department of Health
and Human Services 2009). Welfare fertility rates are represented by the variable
children in welfare family, which is defined by HHS as the average number of cash
recipient children in welfare households in 2006 (US Department of Health and Human
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Services 2007). HHS does not specify the children‟s relationship to the head of
household, meaning that the children in the welfare household may not necessarily be the
children of the payee. The head of household in the welfare family could be an adult
sibling, foster parent, or even family friend payee rather than an actual parent. Data
specifically related to the head of household‟s biological children could not be obtained
through federal or state data sources on a consistent level, so this was the closest
available representation of number of children in welfare families. When examining the
effect of family caps on welfare mothers‟ fertility, it should be kept in mind that the
children reported in the federal statistics are not necessarily the mother‟s biological
children. Welfare population is represented by the variable welfare population. This is
defined as the percentage of states‟ population receiving cash payout and/or cash in-kind
benefits. These statistics were gathered by dividing the number of state cash/in-kind
recipients by the total state population as reported by the U.S. Census (US Bureau of the
Census 2006).
The independent variable is the family cap policy, which is measured as a dummy
variable indicating whether the state has implemented a family cap policy, where 0 = no,
and 1 = yes. This data was obtained from the National Conference of State Legislators
(2009). The control variables include total welfare budget, maximum cash benefit,
welfare family size, state population, population at or below poverty level, state family
size, birth rate, population with high school diploma or GED, unemployment rate, income
per capita, and region. Maximum cash benefit is defined as each state‟s highest cash
payout allowed for a family of three and was taken from the Eighth Annual Report to
Congress (US Department of Health and Human Services 2009). Welfare family size is
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defined as the average number of cash recipients per welfare household in 2006.
Although welfare “family” could involve blood relations, it more broadly encompasses
all adult and child cash recipients under one cash budget (US Department of Health and
Human Services 2007). Poverty level is defined as the percentage of each state‟s
population living at or below the poverty level and was obtained from the U.S. Census
Bureau‟s website (US Bureau of the Census 2007). State family size is measured as the
average family size of each state and was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau (US
Bureau of the Census 2008). Birth rate is defined as the number of live births per 1000
women and was gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau (US Bureau of the Census 2008).
Population with high school diploma or GED is defined as percentage of people 25 years
and older who have graduated from high school or received GEDs. This information was
obtained through the U.S. Census Bureau (US Bureau of the Census 2007).
Unemployment rates are measured as the percentage of each state‟s population who are
unemployed. This data was gathered from the Department of Labor website (2008).
Income per capita is defined as the average income earned by individuals in 2006 and
was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau (2008). Region describes the part of the
country in which the state is located according to the U.S. Census. Each of the four
region variables was transformed into a dummy variable where 0=no, the state is not
located in the named region and 1=yes, the state is located in the named region.

Research hypotheses
The research and null hypotheses are as follows:
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H1 – States with intact family cap policies will have lower welfare cash spending
than non-family cap states.
H0 – Family caps have no effect on states‟ welfare cash spending.

H2 – Welfare recipients in family-cap states will have lower fertility rates than
welfare recipients in non-family cap states.
H0 – Family caps have no effect on welfare recipients‟ fertility rates.

H3 – States with intact family cap policies will have smaller welfare populations
than non-family cap states.
H0 – Family caps have no effect on welfare population size.

The analysis will begin by calculating descriptive statistics including means,
medians, and standard deviations for each variable. Next, T-Tests will be completed in
order to test the strength of the hypotheses. The purpose of the T-Test is to determine if
there is a relationship between the independent and dependent variables. T-Tests compare
the means of dependent variables in order to determine if a statistically significant
difference exists between means of family cap versus non-family cap states. This
determination will establish whether or not the results can be generalized to the entire
population. For each of the dependent variables, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests were
completed and compared with the variables‟ histograms in order to verify that its
distribution was roughly normal. Normal distribution helps to ensure the accuracy of the
T-Test results. Levene‟s tests are also completed in order to determine if there is equal
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variance between two groups, in this case family cap and non-family cap states. If there
is unequal variance between groups, the results cannot be generalized to the population.
After the T-Tests are completed for the three dependent variables, a correlation
analysis will be completed with all continuous variables. The correlation helps to
determine whether there is a relationship between the dependent and independent
variables and will also identify any multicollinearity between independent variables and
control variables. If there is a strong relationship between variables, some may need to
be reviewed so as to not compromise the regression. For this research, the
multicollinearity threshold for removing variables will be 0.60. Once the necessary
variables are removed, the remaining variables will be used to complete the multivariate
regression analyses. This will determine if family caps are associated with lowered
welfare spending per recipient, fertility, and percentage of states‟ population receiving
welfare benefits. The R Square score of each model will help to determine what
percentage of the variance within the dependent variable can be explained by the
independent and control variables. The F score will establish the statistical significance
of these findings. Our B scores will show which variables had the strongest effect on
welfare spending, fertility and welfare population. The t Significance scores will show
which of the predictors had a statistically significant t-test effect on the dependent
variable.
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Results
Univariate Analysis
The dependent variables in this study are: welfare spending per recipient, children
in welfare family, and population on welfare. Welfare per recipient is a continuous
variable representing the average dollar amount of cash welfare benefits spent per
recipient. The mean is $6433.67, the median is $4933.29, and the standard deviation is
$5943.73. This disparity between the mean and median is representative of a large
outlier. Wyoming‟s total welfare budget in 2006 was $22 million for only 518 recipients.
This equates to $42,471.04 spent per recipient. As comparison, the second highest perrecipient state was New York, who averaged $12,876.19 per recipient. However, rather
than sacrificing a valid answer from a small sample, I chose to log the variables in order
to reduce the effects of the outlier. Once the data was logged, it showed a mean of 3.72
and a median of 3.69. Children in welfare family is a continuous variable representing
the average number of children per welfare household. Answers range from 1.10 to 2.00.
The mean is 1.76 and the standard deviation is 0.139. Population on welfare is a
continuous variable which represents the percentage of the population receiving cash
welfare benefits. Answers range from 0.10% to 2.9% with a mean of 1.19% and a
standard deviation of 0.633%.
Family cap is the independent variable. It is a continuous dummy variable where
0 = no, the state does not have a family cap policy in place and 1 = yes, the state has a
family cap policy. 28 states have no family cap, while the remaining 22 states have some
form of family cap in place. The mean is 0.44 and the standard deviation is 0.501.
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The control variables consist of total welfare budget, maximum cash benefit,
welfare family size, state population, population at or below poverty level, state family
size, birth rate, population with high school diploma/GED, unemployment rate, income
per capita, and the region variables Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Total welfare
budget is a continuous variable with budgets ranging from $22 million to $5.67 billion.
The mean is $460.26 million and the standard deviation is $943.64 million. Maximum
cash benefit is a continuous variable ranging from $170 to $923, with a mean of $420 and
a standard deviation of $161.84. Welfare family size is a continuous variable ranging
from 1.80 to 3.30 people. The mean is 2.65 and the standard deviation is 0.387. State
population is a continuous variable ranging from 515,004 to 36,457,549 with a mean of
5,976,399 and standard deviation of 6,662,000 people. Population at or below poverty
level is a continuous variable ranging from 7.8% to 21.10% with a mean of 12.92 and a
standard deviation of 3.052%. State family size is a continuous variable ranging from
2.84 to 3.60, with a mean of 3.13 and a standard deviation of 0.175. Birthrate is a
continuous variable ranging from 42 to 83.2 with a mean of 55.6 and a standard deviation
of 7.529. Population with a high school diploma/GED is a continuous variable ranging
from 78% to 90.7% with a mean of 85.5% and a standard deviation of 3.671%.
Unemployment rate is a continuous variable ranging from 2.5% to 6.9% with a mean of
4.4% and a standard deviation of 1.004%. Income per capita is a continuous variable
ranging from $27,028 to $50,762, with a mean of $35,308.66 and a standard deviation of
$5140.93.
The four region variables were originally one nominal region variable where 1=
Northeast, 2= Midwest, 3= South, and 4= West. For the original variable, the range was
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1-4 with a mode of 3 (South). Region was then split up into 4 dummy variables where 0=
no, the resident does not live in the named region and 1= yes, the resident does live in the
named region. The mean of Northeast is 0.18, the mean of Midwest is 0.26, the mean of
South is 0.30, and the mean of West is 0.26 (Table 1).

Family Cap/Welfare Spending per Recipient T-Test
The objective of the T-Test of the dependent variable welfare spending per
recipient and the independent variable family cap is to test the directional hypothesis
(H1): States with family cap policies in place will have lower welfare per recipient
spending than non-family cap states. Once our hypothesis is tested, we will be able to
determine whether the presence of a family cap is associated with welfare per recipient
spending.
Before the T-Test is completed, certain assumptions must be met. The
distribution of the dependent variable should be normal. This is evaluated through the
frequency data/histogram, and through the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test. Evaluation
of the histogram shows that the welfare per recipient variable‟s distribution is positively
skewed due to an outlier. In order to alleviate this skewed distribution, the welfare
spending per recipient variable was logged. The K-S test‟s Asymp Sig (1-tailed) was
0.06. Because this number is greater than 0.05, we must accept the null hypothesis,
which assumes that the distribution of the dependent variable is normal. After logging
the welfare spending per recipient variable, the second assumption of normal distribution
is met.
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The second assumption is that the variance between the two groups (family cap
and non-family cap) should be relatively equal. This is determined through Levene‟s
test, which analyzes the difference in variance between 2 groups. The Sig score for
Levene‟s test was 0.004. Because this number is less than 0.05, we must assume
heteroscedasticity, which states that there is unequal variance between family cap and
non-family cap states. Once we have determined the heteroscedasticity, we examined the
Sig (1-tailed) in the “equal variances not assumed” row. The T-Test for logged welfare
per recipient showed a Sig (1-tailed) score of 0.08. Because this is greater than 0.05, we
must accept the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between family cap status and
logged welfare per recipient, and therefore the results cannot be generalized to the
population (Table 2).

Family Cap/Children in Welfare Family T-Test
The objective of the T-Test of the dependent variable children in welfare family
and the independent variable family cap is to test the strength of the non-directional
hypothesis (H1): There is a relationship between family cap implementation and states‟
number of children in welfare households.
Based on the frequency data/histogram for children in welfare family, the
distribution is roughly normal. The K-S test showed an Asymp Sig (1-tailed) value of
0.122. Because this number is greater than 0.05, we accept that the distribution of the
dependent variable is normal. Because the histogram and the K-S test agree, the
assumption of a normal distribution is met.
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The homoscedasticity assumption was evaluated by Levene‟s test. The sig score
for the Levene‟s test was 0.049. Because this number is less than 0.05, we must assume
heteroscedasticity. Once we determined the heteroscedasticity, we examined the Sig (1tailed) in the “equal variances not assumed” row. Because the Sig (1-tailed) score of
0.034 is less than 0.05, we have support for our research hypothesis.
The T-Test Sig score shows that the data is statistically significant and can be
generalized to the population. In reviewing the substantive significance, we see that there
was only a difference of 0.0757 children between family cap and non-family cap states,
with non-family cap states averaging 1.789 children in 2006 and family cap states
averaging 1.714. However, because the range for children in welfare families is so
limited, one would expect the mean difference to also be small. The results should not be
discounted. Eta2 equaled 0.069, meaning that we have only a 0.69% chance of fewer
mistakes made estimating the number of welfare children in a state when family cap
status is known (Table 2).

Family Cap/Population on Welfare T-Test
The objective ofthe T-Test of the dependent variable state welfare population and
the independent variable family cap is to test the non-directional hypothesis (H1): There
is a relationship between family cap implementation and states‟ percentage of population
receiving cash assistance.
Based on frequency data and histogram for population on welfare, the distribution
of the dependent variable was normal. The K-S test showed an Asymp Sig (1-tailed)
value of 0.087. Because this number is greater than 0.05, we accept that the distribution

36

of the dependent variable is normal. Because the histogram and the K-S test agree, the
second assumption of normal distribution is met.
The homoscedasticity assumption was evaluated by the Levene‟s test. The sig
score for Levene‟s test was 0.286. Because this number is greater than 0.05, we must
assume homoscedasticity. Once we have determined the homoscedasticity, we examined
the Sig (1-tailed) in the “equal variances assumed” row. The T-Test for welfare
population showed a Sig (1-tailed) score of 0.064. Because this is greater than 0.05, we
must accept the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between family cap status and
states‟ percentage population receiving cash benefits, and therefore the results cannot be
generalized to the population (Table 2).

Correlation Analysis
Before running the regression models, a correlation analysis was completed. The
correlation review showed mixed results. Correlation of children in welfare family and
family cap resulted in a Pearson‟s R score of -0.273. This was significant at the 0.05 level
(1-tailed). Logged welfare spending per recipient and welfare population did not show
statistically significant correlations with family cap. Logged welfare per recipient had a
Pearson‟s R score of 0.217 and welfare population had a Pearson‟s R score of -0.219.
The correlation matrix raised concerns regarding the multicollinearity between
several variables. The South dummy variable was highly correlated with maximum cash
benefit and population with high school diploma/GED. Population at or below poverty
level showed multicollinearity with population with high school diploma/GED and
income per capita. However, after running several models with and without these
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correlated control variables, the decision was made to include them in the regression
analyses. In comparing the models with and without the correlated variables, there was
no meaningful difference in model estimates. However, because the multicollinearity
makes it difficult to achieve statistical significance due to inflation of the standard error,
the following regression models should be interpreted conservatively (Tables 3.1 and
3.2).

Linear Regression- Welfare Spending per Recipient
The first regression model employed used the dependent variable logged welfare
spending per recipient, the independent variable family cap and control variables welfare
population, population at or below poverty level, population with high school
diploma/GED, unemployment rate, income per capita and region. This combination of
variables led to an R Square score of 0.59, which means that 59% of the variance in
welfare per recipient is explained by the independent and control variables. Our F score
was 0.00, which means that the model is statistically significant.
Coefficient Table B showed that family caps did not have a statistically
significant effect on logged welfare spending per recipient. For the control variables,
only welfare population and income per capita showed significant results. For welfare
population, states can expect a 0.203 unit decrease in logged welfare spending per
recipient for every one percent increase in the welfare population. Income per capita
showed that logged welfare spending per recipient would decrease by 0.00002 units for
every dollar increase in income per capita (Table 4).
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Linear Regression- Children in Welfare Family
The second regression model employed the dependent variable children in welfare
family, the independent variable family cap and control variables birth rate, population
with high school diploma/GED, income per capita, maximum cash benefit, population at
or below poverty, and region. For the region dummies, South was the reference category.
Model 2‟s R Square score was 0.28, which states that 28% of the variance in children per
welfare household is explained by the independent and control variables. Our F score
showed a value of 0.115, which means that the model is not statistically significant.
Only family cap and the Midwest region variable had a statistically significant
effect on children in welfare family. States with family cap plans can expect to average
0.091 fewer children in welfare households than non-family cap states. Compared with
the South, living in the Midwest increases the number of children in welfare families by
0.119. Both were statistically significant at the 0.05 level (Table 5).

Linear Regression- Welfare Population
The third regression model included the dependent variable welfare population,
the independent variable family cap and control variables unemployment rate, population
with high school diploma/GED, income per capita, maximum cash benefit, and
population at or below poverty. For the region dummies, South was the reference
category. Model 3 had an R Square score of 0.418, which states that 41.8% of the
variance in cash population is explained by the independent and control variables. Our F
score showed a value of 0.005, which means that the model is statistically significant.
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Family caps did not have a statistically significant relationship with welfare
population. However, population with high school diploma/GED had a statistically
significant effect on welfare population. For every percentage increase in HS
diploma/GED, the welfare population decreases by 0.086%. This was significant at the
0.05 level. All three region variables showed statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
Compared with living in the South, living in the Northeast increases welfare population
by 0.891%, living in the Midwest increases cash population by 0.776%, and living in the
West increases welfare population by .506% (Table 6).

Discussion
Findings
One of the most problematic aspects of my research was multicollinearity. This
was not surprising since one would expect variables related to welfare to have a strong
correlation with one another. Variables related to welfare policy, such as average cash
payout, unemployment rates, education level, and personal income will not relate
exclusively to family caps. They are influenced by one another, and their relationships
inflate the standard error, effectively decreasing the likelihood that the family cap will
show a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. However, the
increased difficulty of reaching statistical significance strengthens the validity of
relationships that do reach statistical significance. For example, the regression analysis
showed that family caps have a statistically significant effect on the number of children
receiving cash benefits. Although the actual mean difference in children between family
cap and non-family cap states was small, the increased standard error allows for a more
confident acceptance of that relationship.
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After researching numerous family cap studies spanning almost two decades, the
generally inconclusive results of my data analysis were not surprising. Like the GAO‟s
family cap study, my research found that although welfare spending and welfare
population size decreased with the presence of a family cap, the results were not
statistically significant. However, it is difficult to rule out the possible effect of family
caps because there are so many outside influences at work. Working on a smaller scale
than Camasso and Jagannathan, I used all 50 states and attempted to incorporate control
variables in the hopes that this would address outside influences. However, the high
degree of multicollinearity led to mainly non-significant results. The results showing a
statistically significant relationship between family caps and number of children in
welfare households partially mirrored a portion of Camasso and Jagannathan‟s fertility
data. They reported that the presence of family caps led to decreased non-marital births.
Although our variables differed, both studies show a statistically significant relationship
between family caps and fertility trends.
In the family cap regression models, both the number of children in welfare
family and welfare population were decreased with the presence of a family cap.
Although only the relationship between family caps and children in welfare families was
statistically significant, the standard error for welfare population was four times higher
than that of children in welfare families. This increased standard error, most likely due to
multicollinearity, decreased the likelihood of achieving statistical significance. However,
it is worth noting that the model still showed a link between family caps and decreased
welfare population. As past family cap researchers have asserted, the difficulty in
isolating welfare variables and eliminating multicollinearity makes it increasingly
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difficult to achieve statistical significance. The relationship between family caps and
welfare population should not necessarily be discounted due to the lack of statistical
significance.
While family caps led to decreased children in welfare families and decreased
welfare population, model 1 showed that family caps led to increased logged welfare
spending per recipient. While I had anticipated nonsignificant relationships, I did not
anticipate this reversed relationship between family caps and welfare spending. Aside
from interference caused by multicollinearity and logged data, the reversed relationship
may be influenced by the lack of implementation distinction for family caps. More
specifically, my research did not compare differences in welfare spending before and
after family cap implementation. Because timelines are not taken in to consideration, it
could be that some states adopted family caps because their welfare spending per
recipient was so large. Rather than family caps affecting states‟ spending, there may be
occurences where excessive spending led to the adoption of a family cap. Although the
spending trend may be decreasing since implementation, this may not yet be apparent in
the 2006 data.

Limitations
One of the major limitations of this study is the availability of data. Many
individual states lack comprehensive and consistent statistics from year to year, and the
data is not easily accessible from most state websites. States also use varying terms to
describe TANF benefits and programs, leading to difficulty in distinguishing federal
funds from state supplemental payments and programs. Since this study focused purely
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on federal benefits, deciphering the individual state‟s data was too unwieldy. While
federal data is more plentiful and reliable, it generally lacks information on state
evaluations and detailed specifics for in-kind services, which would be helpful in
assessing family cap programs and welfare spending.
Another difficulty in this study was in finding national family cap evaluations.
Although there was abundant information on New Jersey‟s family cap, there were very
few large-scale comparative studies. Reviewing the findings and recommendations of
national family cap studies may have given me more direction and a larger pool of
comparison for my research.

Future Research
While reviewing the relationship between welfare spending per recipient and
family caps, I found myself questioning why a stronger relationship did not exist. One
untested theory I contemplated was the effect of partial family caps on states‟ spending.
Family caps policies come in one of three forms: flat cash grants regardless of family
size, partial increases for each child born into a capped family, or total denial of cash
benefits for new children. I would be interested to see if the prohibitive degree of family
caps shows a discernable difference in both child welfare population as well as
subsequent state spending. Does the degree of benefit reduction have an effect on
recipient fertility? If non-family cap states are still interested in adopting caps, perhaps
an evaluation of effectiveness according to programs‟ stringency would be beneficial.
Another course of study might delve deeper into the effects of race, ethnicity,
class, and cultural background on fertility behavior. If financial disincentives are not
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enough to affect childbearing trends, what are the alternatives? Many studies of family
cap programs focus on quantitative data rather than observational studies or surveys of
recipients and low-income women and families. If family caps have not been
conclusively linked to decreased childbirth amongst welfare recipients, perhaps a
different social initiative is in order. Perhaps personal behavioral trends would be better
explored on a micro-level rather than macro-level studies. Additionally, if family caps do
not decisively lead to decreased welfare spending, what programs or policies could be
initiated to address both out-of-wedlock birth and increased welfare budgets?
Evaluations of the success of state-level programs promoting family planning or
education initiatives could lead to recommendations for federal expansion.

Policy Recommendations
Based on this study, my primary policy recommendation is that more research is
needed before Pennsylvania adopts a family cap. Current and prior research indicates
that factors such as recipient demographics and supplementary welfare policies have a
greater effect on fertility and welfare spending than family caps. It would be imprudent
to adopt a policy without first evaluating the needs and trends of Pennsylvania‟s
recipients. I would suggest that a statewide survey of recipients be completed in order to
gauge opinions on fertility trends, work initiatives, and priorities. Although welfare
policy cannot be shaped solely on recipients opinions, surveys may help policy makers to
identify the strongest motivators of women‟s reproductive choices. Family caps rest on
the assumption that financial motivators are strong enough to affect birth trends, but there
may be other avenues to encourage delayed births.
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My second policy recommendation is to focus future welfare reform policy on
recipients‟ children. If theorists believe that social norms and expectations are developed
long before adolescence, it would be practical to involve children as part of their parents‟
welfare educational programs. TANF requirements and/or goals for self-sufficiency
could include enrolling children in after-school or mentoring programs. Many TANFrequired training programs include seminars on the importance of keeping children
healthy. They focus on the significance of scheduled vaccines and maintaining regular
doctor and dentist appointments. While children‟s health is undeniably important,
perhaps TANF literature and training could expand this focus to the importance of
completing school work, maintaining satisfactory grades, and building relationships with
teachers and faculty.
Even beyond welfare policy, schools in low-income and urban neighborhoods
could adopt programs stressing not only the importance of self-improvement, but the
benefits of doing well in school and completing an advanced degree. Children should see
education as the route to financial freedom and adulthood rather than a chore or
punishment. Teachers and mentors should encourage discussions about careers and
opportunities so that children recognize that alternatives to poverty exist. Children spend
the majority of their day in school, so perhaps this early and consistent exposure could
help to shift their expectations for adulthood.

Conclusion
Family cap policies have been a major issue of contention among welfare policy
makers. While they have the potential to decrease states‟ welfare spending and
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encourage responsible family planning practices, implementation raises major concerns.
From a savings perspective, the bulk of family cap research on welfare spending has been
inconclusive. While many studies have pointed to interference from supplementary
welfare programs or inadequate state record keeping, the bottom line is that no conclusive
data exists showing a clear relationship between family caps and decreased welfare
spending. Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of family cap policies is the inherent
personal nature of reproductive choices. A woman‟s decision to marry or have children
cannot be determined by economic variables alone. Without understanding the complex
determinants of childbirth and family structure, a policy maker cannot expect to affect a
woman‟s choices.
Although I do not discount the potential economic and social advantages of
family caps, I believe that substantial research is still needed before additional states
adopt such policies. Perhaps states without family caps should look to more specialized
family planning and educational initiatives rather than family cap adoption. Research
clearly shows that children develop norms and ideals about adulthood, employment, and
reproductive possibilities early in life, and these expectations often lead to action.
Promoting responsible family planning and reducing children born onto welfare rolls may
be possible without financially punitive caps.
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Appendix
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables

VARIABLES

MEASUREMENT

STANDARD
DEVIATION

6433.67

5943.73

1.756

0.139

%

1.191

0.633

Family Cap

0=no, 1=yes

0.440

0.501

Total Welfare Budget

In $ Millions

460.26

943.64

Maximum Cash Benefit

In $ Dollars

420.00

161.84

2.650

0.387

In Millions

5.976

6.662

%

12.916

3.052

3.134

0.175

Per 1,000 Women

55.598

7.529

Pop w/HS Diploma or GED

%

85.502

3.671

Unemployment Rate

%

4.400

1.004

Welfare Spending Per Recipient

In $ Dollars

MEAN

Children in Welfare Family
Population on Welfare

Welfare Family Size
State Population
Pop at or Below Poverty
State Family Size
Birth Rate

Income Per Capita

In $ Dollars

35,308.66

5,140.93

Northeast

0=no, 1=yes

0.18

0.388

Midwest

0=no, 1=yes

0.26

0.443

South

0=no, 1=yes

0.30

0.463

West

0=no, 1=yes

0.26

0.443
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Table 2: T-Test Analysis Results

MEANS
WITHOUT
FAMILY CAP

MEANS WITH
FAMILY CAP

Logged Welfare Per Recipient

3.675

3.783

Children in Welfare Family

1.789

1.714*

1.312%

1.036%

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Population on Welfare
* = significant at 0.05 level
** = significant at 0.01 level
*** = significant at 0.001 level
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Table 3.1: Correlation Analysis

Family
Cap

Family Cap
Logged
Welfare
Spending
Children in
Welfare
Family

Logged
Welfare
Spending

Children
in Welfare
Family

Welfare
Pop

Max Cash
Benefit

Pop at/
below
Poverty

Birth
Rate

-

.217

-

-.273*

-.238*

-

Welfare Pop

-.219

-.498**

.223

-

Max Cash
Benefit

-.266*

.330**

.043

.309*

-

Pop at/ below
Poverty

.013

-.476**

.062

.066

-.565**

-

Birth Rate

.043

-.025

.183

-.204

-.147

.113

-

HS/GED Pop

-.179

.374**

-.030

-.071

.557**

-.771**

.037

Unemployed
Population

-.008

-.274**

.004

.365**

.055

.406**

-.082

Income per
Capita

.079

.514**

-.088

.023

.498**

-.707**

-.255*

Northeast

-.101

.135

-.305*

.253*

.396**

-.357**

-.550**

Midwest

.026

-.086

.256*

.127

.046

-.162

.127

South

.211

-.198

-.108

-.294*

-.617**

.574**

-.010

West

-.158

.175

.123

-.041

.252*

-.125

.365**

* = significant at 0.05 level
** = significant at 0.01 level
*** = significant at 0.001 level
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Table 3.2: Correlation Analysis

HS/GED
Population

Unemployed
Pop

Income
per Capita

Northeast

Midwest

South

West

Family Cap
Logged
Welfare
Spending
Children in
Welfare
Family
Welfare Pop
Max Cash
Benefit
Pop at/ below
Poverty
Birth Rate
HS/GED
Population

-

Unemployed
Population

-.398**

-

Income per
Capita

.353**

-.126

-

Northeast

.197

.021

.523**

-

Midwest

.322*

-.046

-.080

-.278*

-

South

-.698**

.171

-.348**

-.307*

-.388**

-

West

.234

-.151

-.014

-.278*

-.278*

-.388**

* = significant at 0.05 level
** = significant at 0.01 level
*** = significant at 0.001 level
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Table 4: Regression Analysis of Logged Welfare Spending per Recipient (N=50)

VARIABLES

Family Cap
Population on Welfare

B

SE

0.072

0.055

-0.203***

0.051

Pop at or below Poverty

0.009

0.020

Pop with HS/GED

0.014

0.015

Unemployment

0.011

0.031

Income Per Capita

0.000***

0.000

Northeast

0.067

0.116

Midwest

0.039

0.099

West

0.118

0.092

R2

0.590

F

6.395***

* = significant at 0.05 level
** = significant at 0.01 level
*** = significant at 0.001 level
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Table 5: Regression Analysis of Children in Welfare Family (N=50)

VARIABLES

B

SE

Family Cap

-0.091*

0.041

Birth Rate

0.000

0.003

Pop with HS/GED

-0.013

0.010

Income Per Capita

0.000

0.000

Maximum Cash Benefit

0.000

0.000

Pop at or below Poverty

-0.003

0.014

Northeast

-0.078

0.083

Midwest

0.119*

0.067

West

0.061

0.069

R2

0.280

F

1.724

* = significant at 0.05 level
** = significant at 0.01 level
*** = significant at 0.001 level
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Table 6: Regression Analysis of Welfare Population (N=50)

VARIABLES

B

SE

Family Cap

-0.150

0.167

0.143

0.092

Pop with HS/GED

-0.086*

0.043

Income Per Capita

0.000

0.000

Maximum Cash Benefit

0.001

0.001

Pop at or below Poverty

-0.008

0.060

Unemployment

Northeast

0.891**

0.326

Midwest

0.776**

0.274

West

0.506**

0.276

R2

0.418

F

3.189**

* = significant at 0.05 level
** = significant at 0.01 level
*** = significant at 0.001 level
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